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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

HEALTH LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
A MARRIAGE MOST CONVENIENT

TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST*
This symposium explores the complex relationship between health law and
administrative law. It is based on the observation that these two fields of law
are peculiarly intertwined. It attempts to understand why this is so, as well as
whether it is necessary and whether it is desirable. Would we as a society, that
is, be better off if health law were less permeated by administrative law? Even
if we would be better off, is it indeed possible to extricate health law from
administrative law?
This essay begins by defining health law and administrative law. It then
proceeds to describe the function of law, the institutions through which law is
made and applied, and how law is made and applied in the health-care
industry, demonstrating the prominent role of administrative entities in health
care. It next examines why the close relationship between health law and
administrative law exists. In particular, it considers and rejects the thesis that
this close relationship is an artifact of history. The article goes on to develop
an alternative hypothesis that administrative entities play a major role in
overseeing the delivery and finance of health care because of the need for such
oversight and the lack of superior institutional alternatives. This essay
concludes by considering why this permeation of health law by administrative
law is likely to continue, and why this may not be such a bad result.
I. WHAT IS HEALTH LAW? WHAT IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW?
To begin this exploration, we must define our terms. Health law and
administrative law describe domains of law, but they represent different
approaches to classification. Health law encompasses law as it affects a
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particular industry—the health-care industry.1 For the purposes of this article,
I define health law to include law that governs the relationships among healthcare providers, professionals, patients, and the government with respect to the
organization, provision, and financing of health care. It is, therefore, neither a
distinct body of substantive law nor of procedural law, but rather a very broad
and disparate category, tied together only by the fact that it includes law that
governs a particular industry. Because that industry, however, is our largest
industry,2 encompassing nearly one-seventh of our economy,3 and intimately
affecting each of our lives on a regular basis—occasionally literally in matters
of life and death—the law that governs this industry is of vital importance.
The emergence of health law as a distinct body of law is relatively recent.
The study of medical law—forensic medicine and medical negligence—dates
back to the nineteenth century, while bioethics emerged as a field of study in
the 1970s.4 Health law, as broadly defined above, began to appear as a distinct
area of practice in the 1960s and 1970s, and health law as a self-conscious
academic discipline in the 1970s and 1980s.5 The first casebook designed to
teach health law appeared in 1987.6 At the present time, most major law firms
have a health law department, while virtually every law school has at least one
health law course and many law schools have several such courses.
While health law is defined in terms of the industry that it addresses,
administrative law is commonly defined in terms of the nature of the entities
that it governs. Black’s Law Dictionary defines administrative law as “the law
governing the organization and operation of the executive branch of
government (including independent agencies) and the relations of
administrative agencies with the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and
the public.”7 A leading administrative law text offers a similar definition:
“[A]dministrative law consists of those legal principles that define the
authority and structure of administrative agencies, specify the procedural
formalities that agencies use, determine the validity of administrative
1. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS xvii
(1987).
2. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 497 (5th
ed. 2004) (“In 2000, Americans spent $1173.9 billion on personal medical care compared to
$958.8 billion on housing, $928.5 billion on food and tobacco, and $784.9 billion on
transportation.”).
3. Uwe E. Reinhardt et al., U.S. Health Care Spending in an International Context, 23
HEALTH AFF. 10, 11 (2004). In 2001, health spending accounted for 13.9% of the gross domestic
product of the United States. Id.
4. PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED
CARE ERA, 27–30, 49–55 (2002).
5. Id. at 46–47; Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Uses of the Social Transformation of American
Medicine: The Case of Law, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 799 (2004).
6. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 1.
7. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 48 (8th ed. 2004).
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decisions, and outline the role of reviewing courts and other organs of
government in their relation to administrative agencies.”8
These broad definitions obviously encompass the law that governs or
emerges from traditional regulatory agencies that oversee private conduct
through traditional command-and-control regulation.9 They could indeed
include all of public law, except for criminal law, which is traditionally carved
out as a separate domain. Even an understanding of administrative law this
broad, however, might be too narrow to serve our purposes. This is because of
the nature of health-care administrative law.
In fact, traditional command-and-control regulation plays a relatively small
role in health-care law. Certainly, several of the classic federal command-andcontrol regulatory agencies do have jurisdiction over the health-care industry.
The Federal Trade Commission, for example, polices trade restraints within the
health-care industry,10 while the National Labor Relations Board oversees
collective bargaining within health-care institutions.11
Several federal
executive departments also have regulatory jurisdiction over the health-care
industry, including the Labor Department, which regulates ERISA health
benefits plans.12 Regulatory law also imposes general prohibitions that set the
backdrop for licensing or certification requirements. Unauthorized practice of
medicine, for example, is prohibited by state law, and medical licensing boards
have the authority to interpret and enforce these prohibitions.13 Similarly, the
sale of drugs that have not been approved by the federal Food and Drug

8. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 3 (5th ed. 2002).
9. The term “command-and-control regulation” is commonly used as though its meaning
were self-evident. Perhaps the closest one can come to a definition of it, however, is Cass
Sunstein’s descriptions of it:
Congress has often employed command-and-control strategies to accomplish various
regulatory goals, most notably to clean the air and water. Command-and-control
strategies seek to direct private behavior through centralized national bureaucracies.
Often they require all or most industries to adopt inflexible, legally identified methods of
achieving compliance within specified times.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE
87 (1990).
10. Although the jurisdiction of the FTC only extends to for-profit corporations, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 44–45 (2000), this limitation has been interpreted so as to recognize jurisdiction over trade
associations that operate as non-profits but that confer economic benefits on their members. Cal.
Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 765–69 (1999).
11. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW §§ 4-14 to -19, at 115–19 (2d ed. 2000).
Certain special rules apply to health care institutions, however, such as NLRB rules governing
bargaining units in acute-care hospitals. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (2003).
12. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503–1 (2003) (providing the Labor Department’s rules on
ERISA claims determinations and appeals).
13. FURROW ET AL., supra note 11, § 3-3, at 62.
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Administration (FDA) is prohibited by the Food and Drug and Cosmetic Act.14
And much of modern environmental and health and safety legislation grows
out of state and local public health laws, one of our earliest forms of commandand-control regulation. But the exercise of command-and-control regulatory
authority, independent of licensing requirements or payment conditions, is not
characteristic of modern health-care law.
Much more common in health-care law are three other approaches to
regulation. First, there are health-care financing and tax subsidy programs,
which use administrative entities to assure the quality of services, oversee
proper billing and utilization, and deter and punish fraud and abuse. The
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services exercises tremendous power over
the health-care industry through the certification, coverage, and payment rules
that it enforces in connection with its administration of the hundreds of billions
of dollars spent by the Medicare and Medicaid programs on services provided
by health-care professionals, suppliers, and providers.15 The Office of
Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services and
Department of Justice, moreover, enforce additional rules against the same
professionals, providers, and suppliers under their authority to enforce
compliance with the fraud and abuse laws, including the false claims and antikickback prohibitions. The Internal Revenue Service exerts considerable
authority over the operation of hospitals and other health-care institutions
through its interpretation of the laws granting tax-exempt status to “charitable”
institutions,16 and over employee benefit plans through its administration of
laws offering tax subsidies to employers who offer and employees who enroll
in such plans.17 These regulatory interventions are not imposed under the
Commerce Power, like antitrust laws or ERISA, but rather are imposed under
the taxing or spending powers on private entities that choose to participate in
federal health-care financing and subsidy programs. Some of these regulatory
provisions, such as Medicare payment rules, are necessary adjuncts of
government spending programs; others, such as the Emergency Medical

14. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000).
15. The President’s budget for FY 2005 projects Medicare expenditures at $290 billion and
the federal share of the Medicaid program at $182 billion. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND
THE UNINSURED, THE PRESIDENT’S FY 2005 BUDGET PROPOSAL: OVERVIEW AND BRIEFING
CHARTS, 1–2 (June 2004), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7115.cfm.
16. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000); FURROW ET AL., supra note 11, ch. 2, § 2-1 to -16, at
38–50.
17. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 105(h) (2000) (limiting the ability of self-insured plans to
discriminate in favor of highly compensated individuals). The expansion of tax subsidies for new
health-care financing vehicles, such as Health Savings Accounts created by the Medicare
Modernization Act, 26 U.S.C.A. § 223 (2004), portends a greater regulatory role for the I.R.S.
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Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA)18 and the former federal health
planning laws, are much more tangentially related to federal spending
programs but are enforced through these spending programs.
Second, there are licensure and certification programs. In general, healthcare professionals cannot practice their profession within a state unless they are
licensed (or in some instances certified) by the proper board or agency, and,
once licensed, health-care professionals must comply with the rules of these
boards or agencies or risk disciplinary action.19 Any pharmaceutical company
that wants to market a new drug or medical device manufacturer that wants to
introduce a new device must obtain approval from the FDA.20 To obtain and
retain this license or approval, the applicant must conform to certain statutory
and regulatory requirements, which are not imposed as general “commands”
upon society, but rather as conditions of licensure, certification, or approval
with respect to particular professionals, providers, or manufacturers.
The third regulatory model that pervades health care is regulation through
private entities. While private regulation has recently been discovered by
administrative law scholars,21 those of us who work with health law have
known about it for decades.22 Although the theme of private regulation will be
explored in detail below,23 a few illustrative examples demonstrate this point.
The Medicare program is governed by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS), a large government agency located within an executive
department and subject to a complex body of statutes and regulations, but the
day-to-day operation of the program is carried out by private Medicare
contractors, which make their own rules (Local Medicare Review Policies)
under “rulemaking” procedures specified by statute.24 Medicare contractors
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000). See also Dean M. Harris, Beyond Beneficiaries: Using the
Medicare Program to Accomplish Broader Public Goals, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1251, 1273–
82 (2003).
19. Timothy S. Jost, Oversight of the Competence of Healthcare Professionals, in
REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 17, 21–26 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 1997).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000).
21. See, e.g., Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1211
(2003); Jack M. Beermann, Administrative-Law-Like Obligations of Private[Ized] Entities, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1717 (2002); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2003); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000).
22. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals:
Private Regulation of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C. L. REV. 835 (1983).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 46–59.
24. CENTER FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY
MANUAL: LOCAL MEDICAL REVIEW POLICY, available at http://www.cms.gov/manuals/
108_pim/pim83toc.asp (last modified Sept. 16, 2004). See Timothy S. Jost, The Medicare
Coverage Determination Process in the United States, in HEALTHCARE COVERAGE
DETERMINATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 207, 212–13 (Timothy S. Jost
ed., 2005).
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also make coverage adjudications, subject to review by separate private
“qualified review organizations,” whose determinations are in turn subject to
administrative and judicial review.25 Clinical research can only be approved
for federal funding in the United States, and clinical trials can only be
approved as adequate to support Food and Drug Administration new drug
approvals, if the clinical research or trials are approved by Institutional Review
Boards (IRBs), which are private entities constituted in accordance to federal
regulations that must follow procedures established by federal regulations.26
Hospitals that are accredited by the private Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations can participate in the Medicare program by
meeting only minimal additional requirements,27 while managed care
organizations that are accredited can escape certain regulatory requirements in
some states.28 Hospitals that make staff privilege decisions29 or ERISA plans
that make coverage decisions30 are required by the courts to follow procedures
that are essentially administrative, and the courts treat their decisions with
much the same deference afforded the decisions of administrative agencies.
A comprehensive definition of administrative law, therefore (at least with
respect to health law), must include not only the law that emerges from or
governs public agencies that engage in command-and-control regulation, or
even all public governmental agencies (including licensing and certification
agencies and agencies that oversee health-care financing or tax-subsidy
programs), but also the law that controls all “tools of government,” including
private or quasi-public entities that carry out government functions.31 I define
“administrative law,” therefore, idiosyncratically for this article to include law
that emerges from or governs entities (public or private) other than the courts
or legislatures that are rather created or sanctioned by law to carry our public
regulatory functions or to collect and expend public resources.
Common salient characteristics of such entities, explored further below,
are that they are usually designated to carry out public functions because of
special claims to competence or expertise; their acts and decisions are
supposed to serve (at least in part) the public interest; their adjudicatory

25. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1), (c)–(d) (2000).
26. 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.101(a), 56.103 (2004); 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a) (2003).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 488.5 (2003).
28. See Barry R. Furrow, Regulating the Managed Care Revolution: Private Accreditation
and a New System Ethos, 43 VILL. L. REV. 361, 396–99 (1988) (describing managed care
accreditation).
29. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 11, § 4-5 to -6, at 101–105.
30. See Mark D. DeBofsky, The Paradox of the Misuse of Administrative Law in ERISA
Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 727, 727–32 (2004).
31. See generally THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE
(Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) (describing many of the administrative tools utilized by
government).
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decisions are usually subject ultimately to judicial review; that judicial review
is generally deferential because of the entities’ special claims to competence;
these entities are usually authorized to promulgate rules, standards, or
guidelines formally or informally; the “rules” that they promulgate are often
made through processes that include some element of public participation;
their “rules” are usually afforded some deference by the courts; and their acts
are often subject to some level of public scrutiny. These characteristics, of
course, are those described in the federal and state administrative procedure
acts,32 even though those laws may not apply to all of the entities swept within
our broad definition of administrative law.
II. LAW AS MAKING RULES AND DECIDING DISPUTES AND THE INSTITUTIONS
THAT MAKE RULES AND DECIDE DISPUTES IN HEALTH CARE
The understanding of what is meant by administrative entity and by
administrative law that is adopted here is based on an underlying
understanding of the nature of law and of how law functions. To grossly
oversimplify matters that jurisprudes debate endlessly, law serves two basic
purposes in society. First, it establishes (or recognizes) enforceable rules by
which individuals and entities order their relationships with each other and
with society.33 These rules may be based on the underlying norms under
which private and public relationships are in fact conducted, they may reflect a
misunderstanding or distortion of those norms,34 or they may be shaped by a
conscious attempt to create new norms or change existing norms to serve a
particular public purpose.35 Second, law provides institutions that serve to
settle disputes among individuals and entities and between those individuals
and entities and the state.36 These two purposes are, of course, closely
interrelated, as rules may emerge from the settlement of disputes, while the
settlement of disputes presupposes rules with reference to which those disputes
can be resolved. But it is sometimes useful to recognize these two functions as
separate.

32. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, 702, 706 (2000).
33. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 79–99 (2d ed. 1994); Frederick Schauer,
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) (describing the rule-setting function of law).
34. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES, 280–86 (1991); Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological
Theories of Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1987) (describing the relationship between
law and norms).
35. The possibility of law serving a “meliorative function,” striving to achieve a more just
society, can be understood as a third role of law. See Steven D. Smith, Reductionism in Legal
Thought, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 68, 73–75 (1991).
36. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 11–12 (3d prtg.
1960); see also Smith, supra note 35, at 69–71.
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Given common notions of institutional competence, we primarily think of
the elected legislative bodies as laying down rules by enacting laws (usually
with some participation from the executive) and of the courts as settling
disputes by deciding cases. However, rules are laid down and disputes
resolved generally in our society through four different types of institutions.
First, legislatures establish rules through enacted legislation. In doing so they
often also incidentally settle disputes, as when a local city council imposes a
final resolution on a contentious re-zoning dispute. Second, courts do indeed
resolve disputes in both civil disputes among private individuals and
institutions as well as disputes between government and individuals that are
litigated in criminal or civil enforcement cases. In our common law legal
system, courts also articulate rules, interpret and apply statutes and
constitutions, and find the common law when there is no statute or
constitutional provision on point.37
Third, rules are articulated and disputes settled through private
arrangements. Private individuals, through contracts and by the formation of
private entities such as partnerships and corporations, create rules that are
legally enforceable among themselves. These generally reflect the norms that
govern society and are shaped by the market forces affecting commercial
transactions. Private individuals and entities also reach legally binding
resolutions of disputes through negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.
Finally, a great many rules are laid down and disputes resolved by
administrative entities, as broadly defined above. These entities make rules
that govern private conduct (as well as their own conduct) through formal or
informal rulemaking procedures.38 These entities also formally and informally
decide disputes. These disputes usually involve regulatory enforcement (or the
raising or expenditure of public funds), but can also include disputes among
private parties (for example, where the NLRB decides a collective bargaining
dispute or the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development decides a housing discrimination claim).
Health law offers many examples of rules made and disputes resolved
through each of these mechanisms. Congress has enacted a host of statutes
affecting the organization and finance of health care, sometimes as
freestanding legislation, but often as part of omnibus budget bills. Some of the
better-known examples of this legislation are the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),39 the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA),40 and the Health Insurance Portability and

37.
38.
39.
40.

LLEWELLYN, supra note 36, at 12.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (governing rulemaking by federal agencies).
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1411 (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 1395bb (2000).
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Accountability Act (HIPAA).41 State legislatures also regularly enact new
legislation affecting health care.
The state and, to a lesser degree, federal courts are continually resolving
disputes involving health-care issues. Important sectors of health law, notably
malpractice and informed-consent law and much of bioethics, are governed by
the common law that the courts have established. 42 Criminal prosecutions and
civil penalty proceedings brought in the courts have also taken on an
increasingly important role in health care in recent years.
Private contracts and institutional arrangements governing relationships
between professionals, providers, and patients are ubiquitous in health care.43
The use of private alternative dispute resolution approaches, including
mediation, arbitration, and negotiation has also become common in health care.
But, much of health law is administrative law, created and applied by
administrative entities as described above. These include traditional federal
regulatory agencies and commissions, as well as the federal entities that
oversee federal health-care financing and tax-expenditure programs. They also
include a host of state boards and agencies that license and regulate health-care
professionals and health-care institutions, such as hospitals or nursing homes.
States are primarily responsible for regulating health insurance as recognized
by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.44 States actively exercise this power to
guarantee the capacity of insurers to meet their obligations and supervise
insurance claims practices, while at the same time attempting to regulate
insurance underwriting to expand access to insurance.45
As noted above, federal and state regulatory authority, exercised through
command-and-control regulation or federal spending authority, tax subsidies,
and licensing and certification authority, does not begin to exhaust the scope of
administrative oversight over the health-care industry. A complete description
must also include the private and quasi-private entities that either exert public
authority over the health-care industry or are overseen by public law in their
private oversight of the health-care industry.
First, and most obviously, there are private entities essentially created by
federal or state law to extend public oversight over the health-care industry. A
prime example are Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), whose membership

41. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
42. See Lawrence Gostin, The Formulation of Health Policy by The Three Branches of
Government, in SOCIETY’S CHOICES: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN BIOMEDICINE
335, 339–345 (Ruth Ellen Bulgaer et al. eds., 1995) (describing the role of the courts in
healthcare policy-making).
43. Indeed, private arrangements have arguably become more important in recent years as
“transactional” work, arranging relationships between health-care professionals and institutions,
has become a major focus of health law practice. See FURROW ET AL, supra note 2.
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012, 1015 (2000).
45. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, ch. 9, at 566–643.
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and function are specified by federal law.46 These IRBs possess authority
primarily because their approval is necessary if research is to be funded by the
federal government or will result in regulatory approvals issued by the federal
Food and Drug Administration.47
Second, there are pre-existing private entities that contract with the
government to carry out regulatory responsibilities of the government. In this
category must be placed Medicare contractors, who are generally insurers and
data processors who make local coverage and medical review policies and
process and pay Medicare claims.48 Also included are Medicare and Medicaid
HMOs that are often commercial insurers that administer public managed-care
plans in addition to their private business, but which, in doing so, act in the
place of the state in administering public insurance programs.49 Finally there
are Medicare Quality Review Organizations, which are private entities
carrying out public quality and utilization review responsibilities under
contract with the Medicare program.50
Third, there are private entities that have effectively been commandeered
by the government to carry out public regulatory responsibilities even though
they do not necessarily do this under contract. The prime example of this
phenomenon is private accreditation bodies. The Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations was established more than a decade
before the Medicare program and grew out of the Hospital Standardization
Program that antedated Medicare by at least a half-century.51 When the
Medicare program was created, however, it incorporated JCAHO (then Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals or JCAH) accreditation, extending
Medicare certification to accredited hospitals.52 State hospital licensure laws
have also incorporated JCAHO accreditation; indeed, in some states,
accredited hospitals are effectively licensed automatically.53 In more recent
years, both federal and state regulatory authorities have turned to other
accreditation programs, including JCAHO and the National Committee for
Quality Assurance (NCQA), to oversee the quality of health insurers and
46. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–124 (2003) (describing the role of IRBs in approving research
involving human subjects, their composition and procedures).
47. 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.101–124 (2004).
48. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395h, 1395u (2000).
49. See Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated by 526 U.S. 1096 (1999)
(recognizing Medicare HMOs as public actors subject to the Constitution).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-1 to -12 (2000); See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Administrative Law
Issues Involving the Medicare Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review Organization (PRO)
Program: Analysis and Recommendations, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1989) (analyzing administrative
law issues with respect to Medicare Peer Review Organizations).
51. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Medicare and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations: A Healthy Relationship?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 16 (1994).
52. Id. at 18.
53. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3727.02 (1998).
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health-care institutions. These programs create a symbiotic relationship
between the public entity and the private accreditor, under which the public
agency is spared the trouble of devising its own standards and gains the
flexibility and credibility of the private agency, while the private accreditor
gains market share from the public regulatory endorsement as well as enhanced
authority to enforce its regulatory decisions.54
Finally, administrative procedures or judicial review have in some
instances been imposed upon private entities by the courts or legislature.55
Although employee benefit plans are created by private contracts between
employers and insurers or plan administrators for the benefit of employees,
their administrators are treated much like administrative entities under ERISA.
The Department of Labor Regulations, for example, requires ERISA plans to
follow certain claims and appeals procedures that look like those followed by
public agencies.56 The courts have assumed an oversight relationship towards
ERISA plans that resembles judicial review of administrative decisions.
Courts generally require exhaustion of plan remedies before reviewing plan
coverage decisions and generally review those decisions following an arbitrary
and capricious standard.57
Hospital staff privilege decisions offer another example of private
decisions coming under the influence of something that resembles
administrative law. Even though staff privilege decisions essentially govern
the relationship between professionals and private hospitals, courts in a number
of states have required hospitals to follow “fair procedures” that closely
resemble administrative procedures in making staff privilege decisions and
have subjected privileging decisions to something resembling administrative
review.58 The Health Care Quality Improvement Act goes one step further,
essentially requiring hospitals to follow administrative procedures in exchange
for antitrust immunity.59
In sum, health law is thoroughly permeated by administrative law.
Throughout health law one finds entities that are not popularly elected, that are
not courts, and that either are in fact public administrative agencies or are
private entities that resemble administrative agencies making rules and
deciding disputes. Some of these entities are established by statute and are

54. See Jost, supra note 51, at 25–38 (exploring these mutual benefits).
55. See generally DeBofsky, supra note 30.
56. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2003).
57. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989) (courts should
show deference to discretionary judgments of ERISA plans); Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559,
566–68 (9th Cir. 1980) (exhaustion required before filing suit in ERISA cases).
58. See, e.g., Ende v. Cohen, 686 A.2d 1239, 1242–43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997);
Christenson v. Mount Carmel Health, 678 N.E.2d 255, 260 (Ohio Ct. App.1996); Rosenblit v.
Fountain Valley Reg’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 282 Cal. Rptr. 819, 825 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) (2000).
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required by statute to follow specified administrative procedures; others are the
product of private arrangements but have had administrative procedures
imposed upon them by a legislature, the courts, or by regulatory agencies. All,
however, are subject to administrative law or something that closely resembles
it.
III. WHY IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SO PERVASIVE IN HEALTH-CARE LAW?
THE HISTORICAL EXPLANATION EVALUATED
Why is administrative law so pervasive in health-care law? One possible
explanation, put forth by Professor Claeys in his article in this symposium, is
historical. In particular, from the 1960s to the 1980s, there was extraordinary
growth in the health-care industry and the emergence of health law as a distinct
area of practice and academic discipline. It was also a time of extraordinary
ferment in administrative law. It would not be surprising if there was some
cross-fertilization between the two legal domains during this fertile time, if
there was not some degree of “peer pressure” promoting the adoption of
administrative entities and law as health law emerged.60
What was happening in administrative law during this time? Most
noteworthy, there was a dramatic expansion of government regulation.
Beginning with President Johnson’s Great Society, and continuing through
much of the Nixon administration, a host of new regulatory programs were
initiated. The programs focused on the environment and public health and
safety. Federal control over air pollution regulation was established through a
series of laws adopted between 1963 and 1977. The Occupational Safety and
Health Act, creating a sizeable regulatory bureaucracy, was adopted in 1970,
while the Federal Consumer Products Safety Commission was established in
1972. Responsibilities of existing agencies and departments during the 1960s
and early 1970s were also expanded as new regulatory programs were
created.61
There were other trends under way in administrative law at this time as
well. One was a dramatic expansion of the use of rulemaking. The
Administrative Procedures Act had recognized the power in administrative
agencies to regulate through quasi-legislative rules.62 For the two decades
following its enactment, however, agencies continued to establish policy

60. Eric R. Claeys, The Food and Drug Administration and the Command-And-Control
Model of Regulation, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 105 (2005).
61. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 24–31 (1990) (exploring the expanding responsibilities of existing agencies
and departments in the 1970s); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38
STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1272–1315 (1986).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
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primarily through adjudication.63 As the scope of regulatory authority
expanded in the “rights revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s, the agencies
increasingly turned to rulemaking as a more expeditious and efficient means of
setting policy.64 Two Supreme Court decisions, United States v. Florida East
Coast Railway,65 and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council,66 undoubtedly encouraged this trend. As a result,
there was more emphasis on agencies’ rulemaking (quasi-legislative powers)
as opposed to the dispute resolution functions (quasi-judicial powers).67
Many key health law regulatory initiatives date from this period. Medicare
and Medicaid were created in 1965. The Professional Standards Review
Organization program was established in 1972. ERISA was enacted in 1974,
as was the National Health Resources Planning and Development Act, which,
though later repealed, established the state certificate of need programs, many
of which still exist. In general, the agencies created by these statutes
proceeded to adopt rules using the newly invigorated informal rulemaking
process, though many of these rules served to establish agency procedures
rather than to impose regulatory requirements.68 The regulatory output of some
of these entities was, however, quite modest.69
When examined more closely, however, the hypothesis of “administrative
peer pressure” goes only so far. First, though social and environmental
command and control regulation blossomed in the 1960s and 1970s, federal
administrative law has much deeper roots, as does health law. Calls for
increased government regulation emerged from the Populist movement in the
second half of the nineteenth century and from the Progressives at the end of
the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth.70 Responding to this

63. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1039, 1092–93 (1997).
64. Id.; see also BREYER ET AL, supra note 8, at 665–667.
65. 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (limiting the application of ponderous, formal, on-the-record
rulemaking).
66. 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (limiting the judicial imposition of additional burdensome
rulemaking requirements on agencies).
67. The late 1960s and early 1970s also saw an extraordinary burst of activity on the part of
the courts, generally opening up agency procedures, expanding opportunities for the public to
participate in regulatory programs, and engaging in more energetic oversight of administrative
proceedings. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975); Merrill, supra note 63, at 1059–1067. This development is not
directly relevant to our subject, however, and will not be explored here.
68. See, e.g., Imposition of Sanctions on Health Care Practitioners and Providers of Health
Care Services by a Quality Improvement Organization, 42 C.F.R. pt. 1004 (2003) (governing
Peer Review Organization sanction proceedings).
69. As of 1980, the Department of Labor regulations governing ERISA plan claims
processes filled only four pages. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2003).
70. See Rabin, supra note 61, at 1197–243.
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pressure, the Interstate Commerce Commission was created in 1887, and the
Federal Trade Commission in 1914.71 Administrative law flourished during
the New Deal of the 1930s, when the power of the federal bureaucracy was
expanded dramatically to cope comprehensively with the crisis of the
Depression.72 Many agencies created during that time (the National Labor
Relations Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation) continue to play an important role in
regulation of our economy. The Administrative Procedures Act (APA),
adopted in 1946, recognized and confirmed (even as it formalized and
restrained) the power that administrative agencies had gained during the New
Deal.73 The APA formalized the models of notice-and-comment rulemaking
and on-the-record adjudication that form the basis for subsequent
administrative law. It is these models that still predominate in health-care law,
though, as elsewhere in administrative law, they have been modified and
expanded during the intervening half-century.74
Similarly, health law, including health-care administrative law, has roots
that long antedate the 1960s and 1970s. State and local public health
regulation existed before the founding of the Republic and constitutes one of
our oldest forms of administrative law.75 State medical licensure boards were
established in the second half of the nineteenth century.76 State programs
providing care for the mentally ill were well-developed by the end of the
nineteenth century, while state and local programs for aiding the medically
indigent were widespread even before the New Deal.77 At the federal level, the
Food and Drug Administration began to oversee the safety of drugs in the early
twentieth century, and federal medical assistance for welfare recipients began
to appear in 1950.78 There was, therefore, a considerable administrative

71. Id. at 1206–07, 1223–24.
72. Id. at 1243–62; BREYER ET AL., supra note 8, at 21–24.
73. Rabin, supra note 61, at 1265–66; see also JERRY L. MASHAW et al., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 9 (5th ed. 2003).
74. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Governing Medicare, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 92–96 (1999).
The use of informal guidelines and agency opinions has become common in administrative law,
and an even greater extent in health law. Id.
75. See Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of
the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 285–302 (1992); see also Edward
P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice: A Historical Review and
Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care
Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201, 203–08 (1999).
76. Timothy S. Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation, Management, or
the Market?, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 827–31 (1995).
77. TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT?: THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC
HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 67–79 (2003).
78. Id. at 80–82.
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infrastructure in place in health law by the time the expansions of the 1960s
arrived.
The reach of health-care administrative law continued to expand,
moreover, long after the activist 1960s and 1970s had faded into the
deregulatory 1980s and 1990s. Certainly, in health-care law, as elsewhere,
there was some regulatory retrenchment during this period. The National
Health Resources Planning and Development Act was repealed in 1986
(though many states retained their certificate of need programs (CON) after
repeal, and some still remain).79 The Professional Standards Review
Organization Program was reborn in 1982 as the Peer Review Organization
program and soon lost much of its regulatory bite.80 Since then it has morphed
into the Quality Review Organization Program, which eschews aggressive
regulation in favor of educational interventions.81
But other significant health-care regulatory programs were created or
continued to expand during the 1980s and 1990s. The federal nursing home
reform program—one of our most prescriptive federal regulatory programs
(though one tied to a financing program rather than a general command-andcontrol program)—was initiated with new legislation in 1987.82 EMTALA,
adopted as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1985, imposed an obligation on every hospital in the country that participates
in Medicare and has an emergency room to screen and stabilize every patient
who came to the hospital in an emergency, including active labor.83 The
Medicare program moved in the 1980s from cost and charge-based payment
systems that mimicked the private sector to administered price systems (DRGs
for hospitals in 1983 and RBRVS for physicians in 1989) that required a much
higher level of administrative intervention.84 Finally, and perhaps most
dramatically, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA)85 exponentially expanded federal regulation of health insurance and
of the privacy of health-care information. Although the 1960s and 1970s,
79. Lauretta Higgins Wolfson, State Regulation of Health Facility Planning: The Economic
Theory and Political Realities of Certificates of Need, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 261, 269–
73 (2000–2001).
80. JOST, supra note 51, at 27–28.
81. See, e.g., OFFICE OF CLINICAL STANDARDS AND QUALITY, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., QUALITY IMPROVEMENT GROUP PROPOSED SUMMARY OF DRAFT 8TH
STATEMENT OF WORK (May 13, 2004), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/qio/2s.pdf.
82. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 4201, 4214
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3, 1396r (2000)). This program has in fact been relatively
successful in improving conditions within nursing homes. See John V. Jacobi, Competition
Law’s Rule in Health Care Quality, 11 ANNALS HEALTH L. 45, 50–55 (2002).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000).
84. See, e.g., David M. Frankford, The Complexity of Medicare’s Hospital Reimbursement
System: Paradoxes of Averaging, 78 IOWA L. REV. 517 (1993).
85. Pub. L. No. 104-191.
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therefore, certainly were a period of growth for health-care administrative law,
the link between health law and administrative entities and programs both
antedates and postdates this period, calling into question the proposition that it
resulted from developments that occurred during this period.
The most significant challenge to the thesis that health-care administrative
law is a product of the activism of the 1960s and 1970s, however, is the fact
that the classic command-and-control model of administrative law that
characterized that period is not the predominant model of administrative
regulation in health law. The Environmental Protection Agency, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Consumer Products
Safety Commission all promulgate rules with which all affected industries
must comply.86 If entities fail to obey the commands of these agencies, they
face sanctions. In this way, these agencies attempt to control the activities of
subject industries to promote the purposes of their enabling statutes. Some of
these regulatory programs are focused on particular industries or actors, but
their prohibitions are usually general and directed to all affected persons.
But, as noted earlier, although examples of command-and-control
regulation can certainly be found in health-care law, they do not predominate.
Rather, the prevailing models in health care tie regulation to licensure and
certification, to financing, or to tax subsidies.87 Moreover, while the
command-and-control regulatory agencies created in the 1960s and 1970s were
public agencies (primarily federal), private regulation is very common in the
health-care industry. If the predominant examples of administrative law in
health law were a product of “administrative peer pressure,” it would seem
logical that it would look more like the prevailing models of regulation that
emerged elsewhere during this time period.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION OF THE LINK BETWEEN HEALTH LAW
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE
But if the historical peer pressure explanation does not work, how does one
explain the entwinement between health law and administrative law? How
does one explain the fact that entities that are administrative agencies, or
function like them, and that apply and are bound by administrative law or
something that resembles it, are ubiquitous in health care?
One place to begin is with notions of institutional competence.
Recognition that particular legal institutions have particular competencies or
limitations for carrying out legal tasks was one of the key insights of the legal

86. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 87.
87. Professor Claeys identifies the licensure and certification model with the New Deal,
though it goes back beyond the New Deal at least to the beginnings of professional licensure in
the 19th century. See Claeys, supra note 60; see also, Jost, supra note 76, at 827–31.
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process school of jurisprudence.88 Although legal process theory has passed
from fashion in jurisprudence, this approach remains in fact useful for
understanding the allocation of responsibilities among institutions.89 Earlier in
this article, four different institutions were identified that contribute to
establishing rules and resolving conflicts—legislatures, courts, private
ordering, and administrative entities. Examining the capabilities, and the
disabilities, of each of these sets of institutions sheds light on the question of
why we end up with administrative entities playing a central role in governing
health care.
Congress and the state legislatures lay down the basic laws that govern
health care. These laws, in fact, establish most of the administrative entities
that we consider in this essay and set the tasks that they are to pursue and
sketching out the procedures that they must follow.
Legislative bodies have long agendas, however, and cannot begin to attend
to the details that are dealt with by administrative agencies.90 Their processes
are often cumbersome and time-consuming, and they lack that agility and
flexibility that is ideally possessed by administrative entities.91 Legislators are
also generalists and cannot specialize in particular problems to the extent that
administrative entities can. Legislatures are particularly dependent on political
contributors and exposed to lobbyists for powerful interests and thus may not
always be best positioned to carry out the public interest.92 Because
legislatures are exposed politically to an extent that administrative agencies are
not, legislatures are sometimes content to shape the broad outlines of
administrative programs, giving themselves cover with policy advocates but
Finally, many
leaving the contentious details to administrators.93
administrative programs, such as health-care financing programs, require
millions of individualized determinations and could not possibly be run by a
legislature.94 In sum, legislatures can and do establish and set the broad policy
88. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW li, lx–lxii (1994); Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44
ADMIN. L. REV. 567, 577–79 (1992).
89. Legal Process Theory has also been adopted by commentators working in the law and
economics tradition. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
90. HART & SACKS, supra note 88, at xciii.
91. See LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 36–37 (1965).
92. GOSTIN, supra note 42, at 347–48.
93. See David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State,
89 GEO. L.J. 97, 138 (2000). This phenomena of legislative buck passing has also been noted by
scholars in the public choice and positive political theory traditions. David B. Spence,
Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political
Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407, 426–27 (1997).
94. HART & SACKS, supra note 88, at 846; JAFFE, supra note 91, at 37.
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parameters for programs for administering health-care oversight programs, but
they are not adept at running them.
Many of the functions of health-care administrative entities are also
beyond the capacity of the courts. In our legal system, courts decide disputes
between individuals or entities and are largely dependent on those individuals
and entities to provide them with the information necessary to decide those
disputes.95 They lack the capacity for independent fact-finding and, in
particular, are not very adept at identifying and consulting all of the interest
groups affected by particular decisions. The courts, like legislatures, are
usually generalists and lack specialized knowledge about complex fields,
except insofar as the parties to the litigation before them provide them with this
information. The courts also have short attention spans, limited by the
duration of litigation, and cannot take on responsibility for the ongoing
implementation of policy decisions.96 Finally, the courts are even limited in
their capacity for covering their area of core competency—deciding disputes.
Courts would, for example, be quickly overburdened if they had to decide the
literally millions of reconsiderations and appeals that arise in the Medicare
program.97
In sum, legislatures and the judiciary can make only a limited (though very
important) contribution to setting the rules for governing the health-care
industry or for resolving disputes that arise within it. That leaves the two other
approaches identified at the outset for carrying out these tasks—private
ordering and administrative oversight. However, while earlier discussion was
concerned with approaches that were available generally to society when
looking specifically at health care, a fifth institution comes into focus:
professionalism and the use of professional networks and their institutions.

95. Gostin, supra note 42, at 339–40 (discussing the limitations of the courts in making
health law policy). For classic explorations of the limited ability of courts to determine
“polycentric” issues in traditional civil litigation, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281. 1292–98 (1976); see also Lon L. Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–405 (1978).
96. The exception from this generalization, of course, is institutional reform litigation
involving structural injunctions. For a time, structural injunctions were seen as affording the
courts a significant role in policy-making and administration. See Chayes, supra note 95, at
1288–1304. In recent years, however, the courts have been generally hostile to institutional
litigation, which has taken on a rather marginal role. See Myrian Gilles, An Autopsy of the
Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . . It’s Still Moving, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 161–63
(2003).
97. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DISPARITY BETWEEN REQUIREMENTS AND
RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES’ CAPABILITIES 1 (2003) (reporting 3.7 million Medicare Part B appeals
filed at the first level in FY 2001). By contrast, in FY 2003, 252,962 civil cases were filed in the
federal district courts. News Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business
of the Federal Courts in FY 2003: Substantial Caseloads Continue to Fill Courts 2 (Mar. 16,
2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/judbus03.pdf.
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Health care is delivered by professionals. These professionals relate to one
another, to their patients, to institutions, and to governments as private
individuals operating within markets and subject to ordinary social norms. The
terms under which health-care professionals deliver their services are to some
extent governed by the general laws of supply and demand98 and are subject to
the social norms that govern society, such as prohibitions against killing or
stealing. Professionals are also subject to oversight by a host of administrative
entities, as we have already noted.
Beyond societal norms and the laws of supply and demand, health-care
professionals also function within professional networks and are subject to
their own norms and institutions.99 Professionals often belong to professional
associations, which have their own codes of conduct that may or may not be
sanctioned by law.100 Some professional associations also assist in peer review
or peer dispute resolution,101 a function that is often carried on informally in
networks.
Sociologists have long noted the unique characteristics of professionals as
opposed to other occupational or social groups.102 In particular, they have
observed that professionals have been able, to a considerable extent, to govern
themselves through their own institutions, establishing their own ethical
standards, entry requirements, and training programs, as well as the internal
divisions and external boundaries of their professions.103 Although some
economists have been highly skeptical about the claims of the professions to
special treatment,104 Kenneth Arrow, in his famed essay, Uncertainty and the
Welfare Economics of Medical Care, speculated that some degree of selfgovernance within the health-care professions might make sense in the face of

98. See generally THOMAS RICE, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED (1998)
(taking the position that the laws of economics apply only imprecisely to health care). The extent
to which health-care professionals are or are not governed by these laws is a complex topic,
which will be discussed further below.
99. See, e.g., ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC (2001); see also
Deborah A. Savage, Change and Response: An Economic Theory of Professions with an
Application to Pharmacy 32–33, 99–100, 140 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file
with Homer Babbidge Library, Storrs, CT).
100. See, e.g., Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 614 N.E.2d 748, 751–52 (Ohio 1993)
(recognizing that a doctor may be disciplined by a medical disciplinary board under Ohio law for
violating the ethical standards of a professional association regarding sexual behavior).
101. See AM. HEALTH LAWYERS’ ASS’N, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICE
(offering alternative dispute resolution services since 1992), at http://www.healthlawyers.org/adr
(last visited on Oct. 4, 2004).
102. ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS: A STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
FORMAL KNOWLEDGE 1–62 (1986); ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN
ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 35–58 (1988).
103. See, e.g., FREIDSON, supra note 99.
104. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137–60 (1962).
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failures that attended the market for medical services, most particularly those
caused by problems of uncertainty.105 More recently, economist Deborah
Savage has contended that professionals produce services neither as atomistic
individual participants in markets defined by competition, nor as employees in
hierarchically organized firms, but rather within professional networks that are
largely self-governing.106
Professionalism presents a distinct alternative to general private ordering.
Professional norms, for example, are not identical to those that govern society
in general. Norms respecting honesty, for example, can be interpreted
somewhat idiosyncratically in the professional-patient relationship,107 while
professionals in relationship to their patients are held to a higher standard of
propriety in sexual conduct than the standards that may govern relationships
outside of a professional context.108 Even norms relating to killing may be
bent when terminal care of a patient in terrible pain is at stake.109 Professional
networks also result in behavior that can be characterized as market restraints.
Professional ethical constraints, for example, have long limited physician
advertising.110
Both Deborah Savage and Eliot Freidson focus on the unique
characteristics of professional knowledge as explaining the unique institutions
of professionalism. Professional knowledge (as opposed to other forms of
knowledge) is complex, theoretical, largely tacit (unverbalized and often
unverbalizable),111 and both routine, in the sense that services are performed
similarly by the same professionals everywhere, and nonroutine (discretionary
in Freidson’s language112), because it is applied differently in the situation of

105. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941, 966–67 (1963).
106. Savage, supra note 99, at 32–33; see also Deborah A. Savage, Professional Sovereignty
Revisited: The Network Transformation of American Medicine, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
661, (2004).
107. While a doctor is generally obligated to reveal information to a patient honestly
regarding the risks and alternatives of a medical procedure, the doctor may be free from an
obligation of full disclosure under the therapeutic privilege when full disclosure might itself harm
the patient. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
108. A doctor, for example, is not permitted to have a sexual relationship with a patient, even
if both of them consent to the relationship. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS,
AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS, Op.
8.14 at 230 (2002–2003).
109. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736–37, 780 (1997) (O’Connor, J., &
Souter, J., concurring) (accepting the position that terminal sedation may be acceptable under
extenuating circumstances).
110. FURROW ET AL., supra note 11, § 14-10, at 693–96.
111. FREIDSON, supra note 99, at 24–27.
112. Id. at 31–35.
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each individual patient. Professional knowledge is shared among professional
networks. To quote Savage:
I define professions as networks of shared competence. . . . For the purposes of
this discussion, it will suffice to think of networks as non-hierarchical
governance modes that manage shared capabilities. Professional networks
identify core competences, build capabilities, and institutionalize knowledge
flows. That is, professions store, acquire, develop, transmit, protect, and earn
rents from their capabilities. They compete with other professions and other
organizations by attempting to take advantage of their capabilities more
quickly and ably than others.
What is a shared competence? The locus of professional production is a
well-defined community of practitioners possessing an esoteric knowledge
core (citation omitted). Since this knowledge is tacit, or perhaps esoteric, it is
hard to specify in explicit terms what it is that practitioners know. We can,
however, observe what they do. Within a profession, the routines of individual
practitioners exhibit certain similarities. For example, lawyers evaluate
whether a particular problem falls within the expertise of both the legal system
and their own legal abilities. That is, they select and evaluate problems using
the same criteria, even if they reach different conclusions. One source of their
ability to do this is a shared background, usually because they have completed
similar education and training programs and have shared work experiences
(“practice”).
This means that the decisions of professionals, bringing to bear skills and
knowledge in solving a production problem, follow what in the engineering
profession is called “next bench design.” What professionals can and will do
depends on what the professional system can do. Each professional’s
decisions are constrained by the capabilities of the network as a whole, and
their decisions must be implemented within the system. 113

In this sense, professional competences are routines shared among
individual practitioners. In performing a routine, the individual professional
wants to be sure that her activities “interface” with the routines of others.114
Each individual practitioner represents embodied or human capital, often in the
form of tacit knowledge, but the products and services that each produces
require integration of this esoteric knowledge base across practitioners.115
Savage argues that the creation, transmission, enhancement and application
of such professional knowledge optimally takes place neither in markets
composed of individual and atomistic competitors, nor in hierarchically
organized firms, but in networks composed of independent yet linked

113. Savage, supra note 99, at 23–24.
114. Id. at 30.
115. Id at 30–31.
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professionals.116 These networks, in turn, develop their own self-governing
institutions that assure the transmission and enlargement of tacit and formal
knowledge by controlling entrance into the profession and exit from the
profession, boundaries of the profession, and ethical behavior within the
profession.117
The relatively benign explanation of the development of professional
power by Freidson, Savage, Arrow and others is far from universally accepted.
Critics such as Milton Friedman,118 Jeffrey Berlant,119 Paul Starr,120 Clark
Havighurst,121 and others see professional autonomy and authority as the result
of the exercise of political and economic power, largely lacking in legitimate
economic or social justification. For our purposes, however, it is not necessary
to resolve this argument. In fact, professionalism and professional networks
have been accepted and continue to be accepted in the United States as a
legitimate approach to making rules and resolving disputes. The Supreme
Court recently held that professional restraints on advertising by dentists must
be handled differently than restraints on advertising would be handled
elsewhere in the economy because of the unique characteristics of professional
services.122 Congress and state legislatures continue to recognize professional
certification and accreditation as acceptable alternatives to external
regulation.123 Professionalism, legitimate or not (or, most probably, as
partially legitimate and partially not) must be considered as yet another
approach to legal ordering.
Adding, then, the possibility of regulation of conduct through professional
networks, we are left with three alternative approaches to governing the healthcare industry: private ordering through market forces and social norms,

116. Id at 16–57; see also FREIDSON, supra note 99, at 1–2 (making the same point from the
perspective of a sociologist).
117. Savage, supra note 99, at 99–141.
118. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 104, at 149–160.
119. See generally JEFFREY LIONEL BERLANT, PROFESSION AND MONOPOLY: A STUDY OF
MEDICINE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN, 177–308 (1975).
120. See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
(1982).
121. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, The Professional Paradigm of Medical Care: Obstacle to
Decentralization, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 415, 419–21 (1990); Clark C. Havighurst, Decentralizing
Decision Making: Private Contract versus Professional Norms, in MARKET REFORMS IN HEALTH
CARE: CURRENT ISSUES, NEW DIRECTIONS, STRATEGIC DECISIONS 22, 23–26 (Jack A. Meyer
ed., 1983).
122. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771–74 (1999).
123. See Medicare Modernization Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w–104(j) (West 2004) (deeming
accredited prescription drug plans and Medicare Advantage plans to be in compliance with
certain regulatory requirements); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395m(a)(20) (West 2004) (identifying
quality standards governing supplemental medical insurance benefits for the aged and disabled).
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administrative regulation and dispute resolution, and regulation and dispute
resolution through professional networks.
As a general matter in our liberal American society, we leave most matters
to private ordering, i.e. to private contracts, firms, and associations operating
within the framework of social norms and markets, unless there is a good
reason to do otherwise. However, no country in the world leaves health-care
organization and finance purely to private ordering, and the United States is no
exception. There are several reasons for this phenomenon.
First, and most basically, private arrangements cannot assure universal
access to health care. I have fully explained the reasons for this elsewhere and
will only sketch them out here.124 The need for health-care services varies
dramatically across our population, with a small percentage of the population
consuming most of our nation’s health-care resources in any given year while
half of the population uses virtually no resources at all.125 Those who use the
most health-care resources, however, are not necessarily those who have the
most financial resources; indeed, the contrary is often the case.126 To some
extent this unequal distribution of resources and need is evened out through
private insurance, but private insurers must necessarily steer away from those
who can be predicted to have the highest health-care costs unless an insurer is
able to charge rates that cover the increased risk, rates that would be
unaffordable to many high-need persons.127 Even the rates charged persons
presenting “normal” risks, however, are unaffordable to many low-income
persons. Unaffordability is one of the primary reasons one-sixth of our
population is uninsured, and far more would be were it not for public
insurance.128
Some form of public health insurance is the most common response to this
conundrum.
But public health insurance programs require eligibility,
coverage, and payment rules; institutions to decide disputes involving these
rules; and fraud and abuse enforcement mechanisms for dealing with those
who do not play by the rules. Under some circumstances, public insurance
programs also rely on private claims processors or managed-care organizations
in an attempt to appropriate the supposed efficiencies of private ordering for

124. See JOST, supra note 77, at 8–18.
125. See Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Care Expenditures,
Revisited, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 9, 12–13. In any given year, 1% of the population
accounts for 27% of health care costs, 5% for more than 50%. Id. The least expensive 50% of
the population accounts for only 3% of health-care expenditures. Id.
126. See, e.g., Michael Marmot, The Influence of Income on Health: Views of an
Epidemiologist, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 31.
127. JOST, supra note 77, at 11–14.
128. See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION, THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER 2 (2003), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/
loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=29345.
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the benefit of public programs.129 In the United States, there have been
attempts to maximize private insurance coverage in lieu of establishing public
coverage.130 At the federal level, we have primarily pursued a carrot strategy,
trying to encourage employment-related health insurance coverage by offering
employers tax incentives and protection from state lawsuits (and to some
extent regulation) through ERISA.131 The states have pursued more of a stick
strategy, regulating individual and small group insurance markets to extend
coverage through coverage mandates, preexisting condition bans, guaranteed
issue and renewal requirements, and community rating requirements or other
limitations on underwriting.132 Even putting aside the use of regulatory power
to expand coverage, moreover, private insurance must in any event be
regulated to assure solvency and fair claims practices.133 Insuring access to
health care, therefore, inevitably requires some form of regulation.
Though health insurance solves, to some extent, the problem of access to
care within markets, it inevitably brings with it the problem of moral hazard.134
The marginal cost of health care to insured patients is essentially the amount of
cost-sharing obligations (plus transportation costs and the value of time spent
receiving health care). For some services and some patients, these costs may
be very low. Patients have an incentive, therefore, to consume insured health
care regardless of whether the benefits of that health care exceed its costs.
Professionals and providers also have an incentive to order, prescribe, refer for,
or provide insured health-care products and services without carefully
weighing the true cost and benefits because the products and services cost so
little to the individual patient (and often produce a considerable benefit to the
provider).135
Insurers, public and private, attempt to combat moral hazard by changing
the incentives of providers or by screening claims or the utilization of
services.136 Medicare contractors, for example, screen against the provision of

129. This is true with the Medicare program in the United States. See supra text
accompanying notes 48-50.
130. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Public or Private Approaches to Insuring the Uninsured,
Lessons from International Experience with Private Insurance, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 463–68
(2001).
131. JOST, supra note 77, at 184–85.
132. FURROW ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-4, at 474–82. In recent years, the federal
government has also begun to use command-and-control regulation imposing coverage mandates
for persons who lose employment-related insurance, (COBRA), and limiting the use of
preexisting condition clauses. Id. at §§ 9-6 to 9-7, at 486–91.
133. Id. at § 9-4(a), at 474.
134. RICE, supra note 98, at 82–84.
135. See id. at 107–15. Though there is widespread belief that physician-induced demand is a
problem in health care, its extent is quite controversial. Id.
136. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 11, § 9-8, at 492, § 7-12, at 409.
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excess services.137 Fraud and abuse enforcement is another response to
extreme manifestations of moral hazard. However, aggressive utilization
review may deny access to needed services or worsen inequities in access to
health-care services.138 For this reason the state and federal governments
mandate the provision of some services, limit the use of some forms of
provider incentives, and impose internal and external appeal procedures on
health plans.139
Another commonly identified limitation of private ordering in health care
is the lack of, or asymmetric availability of, information about health care.140
The human body is infinite in its complexity, and when it malfunctions or is
injured, patients often have little idea as to what is wrong or how to address the
problem. Patients seek out health-care professionals and providers for help,
but they are rarely in a position to judge the competency of the professionals or
providers whom they consult or to evaluate the information and assistance that
those professionals and providers offer. Even following an episode of
treatment, a patient may not be able to evaluate retrospectively the quality, or
even efficacy, of services received.141 The patient’s condition may well have
improved without the treatment, or it may have gotten worse no matter what
was tried. Moreover, even professionals are often uncertain about what is
wrong with a patient or how to treat the patient’s symptoms, though they are
usually better informed than are their patients. In this environment of
information deficits, private ordering is problematic.142
Patients in health-care markets not only lack quality of service information,
but often price information as well. Health-care treatment is often complex,
involving a number of products and services and a variety of product and
service providers. It is rare that a patient can know beforehand exactly what a
treatment will cost, even when it is provided by a single professional. Indeed,
a professional may not have any idea what a complex service is going to cost.
Comparison shopping, therefore, is often difficult if not impossible.143
137.
138.
139.
140.

42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2000).
See FURROW ET AL., supra note 11, § 7-12, at 409.
See id. § 9-8, at 493.
See MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, AND
ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 41–47 (1997); see also RICE, supra note 98, at 68–74;
Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the Medical Marketplace, 66
MO. L. REV. 341, 383 (2001); Jost, supra note 76, at 850–51.
141. RICE, supra note 98, at 73–74.
142. The problematic character of professional knowledge, is, of course, the justification for
professionalism, professional networks, and professional self-regulation. See supra text
accompanying notes 111–15.
143. See Jost, supra note 76, at 853–55 (discussing how consumers manage health-care
information). Recent treatments of the problems of information and agency in health-care
markets have also taken into account the effects of decision-making heuristic shortcuts applied to
process information when consumers are presented with large bodies of complex information and

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

26

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:1

Patients often rely on their physicians to make health-care purchasing
decisions for them.144 Professionals also often have some power over the
resources of health-care institutions.145 Health-care professionals are rarely
single-minded in their allegiance to either the patient or the institution. They
must often keep in mind the interests of the patient, a health-care institution, an
insurer or managed-care organization and last, but often far from least, their
own financial and professional interests. Simple ordering through private
agreements in this context of conflicted agency is highly problematic.
The traditional response to these problems of information and agency has
been regulation. Professional licensure and certification reduce the patient’s
risk in information poor and interest conflicted situations by putting a floor
under the competency of and imposing ethical obligations on those who act as
health care professionals.146 FDA approval of drugs and devices similarly
helps to assure that prescribed drugs and devices available to consumers are at
least for some conditions safe and effective. Regulation has increasingly been
used to encourage disclosure of information to consumers, increasing the
ability of consumers to function in information-poor markets.147 Programs
rating institutions or insurers are directed at improving the environment in
which patients act as consumers.148 Institutional review boards play a dual role
here, both making certain that research proposals meet requirements of
scientific validity before human research participants are asked to sign up for
them and also making sure that the information that participants receive prior
to signing up for the research provides enough information to make a
meaningful choice.149

must cope with this information limited by “bounded rationality.” Thus, for example, consumers
may focus on information received most recently or presenting the most dramatic risk. Id.; see
also Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete
Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 48–59 (1999)
(examining ramifications of bounded rationality for managed care contracting). The problem of
“bounded rationality” limits to some extent the standard response to information-poor markets—
the production of more information through, among other things, disclosure requirements. Id.
144. HALL, supra note 140, at 45–47; see also, Agrawal, supra note 140, at 383. For
example, physicians prescribe medications, order durable medical equipment or physical therapy,
refer to specialists, and admit to hospitals.
145. By their control over the hospital medical staff, doctors have some control over the
number and specialty of physicians practicing at a hospital.
146. See Arrow, supra note 105, at 966–67.
147. But see supra notes 140–42 (discussing information poor markets); see also Jost, supra
note 76, at 850–55 (describing limitations with “report card” solutions).
148. See Deborah Haas-Wilson, Arrow and the Information Market Failure in Health Care:
The Changing Content and Sources of Health Care Information, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
1031, 1040–41 (2001).
149. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 1473–90.
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Health-care markets arguably fail in other ways, further limiting the
viability of private ordering. Health-care purchasing decisions, for example,
are attended by externalities that limit the effectiveness of consumer choice as
the sole means of allocating resources. My decision to forgo having my child
vaccinated, for example, may result in the spread of an infectious disease to my
neighbor’s child.150 My neighbor’s decision to seek medical attention for a
serious, but treatable, medical problem may increase my welfare by relieving
me from the burden of observing him in constant pain.151 Vaccination and
other public health requirements, on the one hand, and public health insurance,
on the other, may thus prevent negative or create positive externalities.
Artificial constraints on the supply of health-care services can result in
artificially high prices or low supply of products or services.152 These forms of
market failure have been used to justify other regulatory interventions, notably
the use of the antitrust laws.
Although the most obvious alternative to private ordering through the use
of markets is government regulation, defects in private ordering have also been
addressed through professional self-governance. Kenneth Arrow’s seminal
article Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care observed that
many of the organizational characteristics of the health-care industrythe
nonprofit organization of health-care institutions, subsidization of medical
education, and professional certification and licensure, make sense in terms of
professionals attempting to maintain trust in the face of consumer
uncertainty.153 Additional common examples of self-regulation by
professionals include peer review of staff privileges in hospitals, accreditation
programs, and Medicare Peer Review Organizations.154
Professional self-regulation has continued unabated in the face of the
growth of external regulation of health care in recent years.155 Indeed, it has
recently received a boost from the Institute of Medicine’s work on quality of
health care, which has been read as criticizing licensure agency discipline or
tort liability-based approaches to quality oversight.156 Recent literature on
“trust-enhancing” regulation also questions the value of external commandand-control regulation as opposed to professional ethics.157 Although the worst

150. See RICE, supra note 98, at 23–24.
151. Id. at 33–38.
152. See id. at 115–18 (discussing the movement towards more monopoly power in hospitals
and health plans).
153. Arrow, supra note 105, at 96467.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 2130, 4659.
155. See Peter D. Jacobson, Regulating Health Care: From Self-Regulation to SelfRegulation?, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1165 (2001).
156. See COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 78 (2001).
157. Mark A. Hall, Arrow on Trust, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1131, 114042 (2001).
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excesses of self-regulation, such as peer review of fees or absolute ethical
prohibitions on advertising, have been squelched by the antitrust laws, the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in California Dental Association v. Federal
Trade Commission recognized an ongoing role for professional self-regulation,
indeed regulation of advertising, because of the unique characteristics of
health-care markets.158
The problem is that while professional self-regulation can be understood as
serving the public interest by responding to information deficit and agency
problems in health care, it can also be seen as restraining trade and facilitating
the preservation and consolidation of professional power. Indeed, Paul Starr’s
The Social Transformation of American Medicine became the most influential
vision of the history of American health care in the twentieth century because
of its convincing description of how physicians had been able to parlay the
control over medical knowledge afforded to them by the scientific revolution
to gain political and economic control over health care as well.159 The scope
the law had granted them for self-regulation played a key role in this rise of
physician power.160
One response to professional self-regulation could have been simply to
outlaw it. However, this response, though frequently debated, has never
caught on. In the end, the arguments of Freidson, Savage and others that
health-care professionals have the best knowledge base for judging one
another’s work has carried the day. There is also a benefit to society in
maintaining among professionals a sense of responsibility for self-criticism and
peer oversight.161 As noted above, recent considerations of quality oversight
have endorsed a continuing key role for peer review. Moreover, given the
political power of organized medicine, it would probably not be politically
possible to replace peer review with external regulation.162
The alternative that we have ended up with is a fourfold response. First,
the worst excesses of professional self-regulation, as has already been noted,
have been outlawed, often as violations of antitrust laws.163 Second,
professional regulation has been supplemented by external regulation. The
158. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
159. Starr, supra note 120; see also Special Issue: Transforming American Medicine: A
Twenty-Year Retrospective on the Social Transformation of American Medicine, 29 J. HEALTH,
POL., POL’Y & L. 557–1023 (2005).
160. See STARR, supra note 120, at 20, 28, 102107.
161. See David Orentlicher, The Role of Professional Self-Regulation, in REGULATION OF
THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 129, 13033 (1997).
162. The health-care industry spent more on lobbying in 2003 than any other industry. The
AMA alone spent $17.3 million. American Political Network, 10 AM. HEALTH LINE 9 (June 15,
2004) at http://www.americanhealthline.com. The AMA is rated twelfth on Fortune Magazine’s
list of most powerful lobbying groups. See The Power 25, Top Lobbying Groups, FORTUNE (July
20, 2004), at http://www.fortune.com/fortune/power25.
163. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 11, § 14-10, at 693–96.
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Stark self-referral laws, for example, were adopted because professionals had
failed to address an obvious, indeed embarrassing, problem of conflicts of
interest in the medical profession.164 Third, the courts and legislatures have
imposed upon peer review processes the harness of administrative procedure.
In a number of states, the courts require bodies that credential hospital medical
staff, for example, to provide “fair procedure.”165 The Health Care Quality
Improvement Act goes even further, offering protection to hospitals that offer
full administrative due process in staff privileging procedures.166 Finally,
courts afford judicial review to those who are aggrieved by peer review
proceedings.167 This form of review, however, resembles closely judicial
review of administrative decisions, requiring exhaustion of in-hospital
remedies and deferring to peer review findings of fact and application of
decision-making discretion.168
In sum, however, what has happened is that professional self-governance
in health care has become subject to administrative law. That is to say,
professional self-governance has been recognized as a viable and legitimate
alternative to public regulation, but the legislatures and courts have subjected
professional self-regulation, to a considerable degree, to the same
administrative law constraints imposed on public regulatory entities. This has
also been true when private organizations have been used to achieve other
public ends, such as the administration of public health-care financing
programs.169 The result has been the phenomenon that is the subject of this
paperthe dominance of administrative law in health care.
At the outset we identified three types of health-care programs in which
administrative law was found: financing tax-subsidy programs, licensure and
certification programs, and private regulation. The discussion just concluded
suggests why these three types of programs exist and persist. First, private
ordering cannot assure universal access to health-care finance, and public
regulation exists to oversee public financing, to expand private financing, to
control moral hazard, and to police private insurer responses to moral hazard.
Second, public licensing and certification programs exist to address

164. Id. § 13-8, at 648–50.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 5859.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 11112 (2000).
167. FURROW ET AL., supra note 11, § 4-5, at 101–02.
168. Id. §§ 4-3, at 98, 4-6, at 104–05.
169. Thus, as noted above, privately insured ERISA employee-benefit plans are subject to
external review under state law, internal review of ERISA plans are regulated by Labor
Department regulations, and ERISA plan decisions are subject to (deferential) judicial review.
See supra text accompanying notes 5657. Federal rules provide for review of the decisions of
Medicare contractors, subjecting them to administrative law controls. Reconsiderations and
Appeals, 42 C.F.R. pt. 478 (2003); see also Grievances, Organization Determinations and
Appeals, 42 C.F.R. pt. 422(M) (2004) (relating to Medicare Advantage plans).
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information deficiencies, real or perceived, in health-care markets. Third,
private regulatory programs exist to facilitate the functioning of professional
networks. These private regulatory programs are often brought under the sway
of public administrative law, or something closely resembling it, to enhance
the likelihood that they will serve the public interest.
V. HEALTH-CARE LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: MARRIAGE MADE IN
HEAVEN OR ILL-ADVISED?
Having identified explanations as to the predominance of administrative
law in health-care law, we must still address the final question presented, at
least implicitly, by this symposium: Would we be better off without this
dominance? Are health law and administrative law inextricably entwined, or is
their combination a marriage of convenience that can be disentwined when it
results in inconvenience?
This question can be usefully separated into two subsidiary questions.
First, would our health-care system be better off without the pervasive
presence of administrative entitiespublic and private? Second, would it be
better off without the influence of administrative law as such?
The first question we have already discussed at some length. What
alternatives are superior to administrative oversight? One answer is greater use
of legislation and of the courts. Private qui tam litigation in the courts
enforcing a broad statutory prohibition against false claims offers one example
of how this might work.170 The Civil False Claims Act,171 and in particular its
qui tam provisions,172 has had a huge impact on the health-care industry. The
same could be said to a lesser extent of private antitrust legislation,173 or
private RICO suits.174
Our experience here, however, does not offer a great deal of
encouragement for moving in this direction. Private enforcement of public law
has been criticized as distorting enforcement priorities, encouraging expensive
litigation, and diminishing the predictability of the law.175 Its effectiveness has,

170. See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4354 (2002) (describing the
use of qui tam litigation to prosecute health-care fraud).
171. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000).
172. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).
174. 18 U.S.C. § 1864 (2000). See generally Bucy, supra note 170 (describing the variety of
private mechanisms used for law enforcement).
175. Joan H. Krause, A Conceptual Model of Health Care Fraud Enforcement, 12 J.L. &
POL’Y 55, 137141 (2003) (describing problems with private enforcement under qui tam); see
Bucy, supra note 170, at 6268.
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in most instances, been enhanced when the effect of the governing statute has
been clarified and magnified by the actions of an administrative agency.176
A more challenging response is that we should rely on private ordering,
and in particular markets, to take the place of administrative oversight. This
assertion enjoys broad support among politicians and considerable support
among academics, though it is contested by others. How one evaluates the
capacities of private ordering depends in part on how seriously one takes
market failures in health care. If the problems of information and agency
described above are in fact intractable, then internal and external
administrative review are necessary to assure high quality and appropriate
utilization in health care. However, if information and agency problems in
health care are in fact surmountable (if, for example, they can be solved by
increased disclosure or by application of the internet), then administrative
oversight may be superfluous, even harmful. Even if one views market
failures in health care as serious, it is arguable that administrative intervention
makes things worse rather than better. External bureaucratic oversight may
create additional inefficiencies, exacerbating rather than solving problems.
A great deal of ink has been spilled on this topic, and we cannot resolve it
or even exhaustively describe it here.177 Suffice it to say, however, that it is
not conceivable that we are going to completely abandon quality oversight
regulation in the foreseeable future. Professional licensure has been criticized
for years and at the margins has been subjected to sunset legislation, but there
is no significant political appeal to the idea of abolishing it and to letting
anyone practice medicine who believes he or she can do it.178 Similarly, there
is no political traction behind the idea of abolishing the FDA. Alternative and
complementary medicine remains largely unregulated, but even here there has
been movement in the recent past toward more regulatory control.179

176. The HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) regulates false claims. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) regulate antitrust laws. The compliance
guidelines of the OIG are available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/complianceguidance.html
(last visited Nov. 7, 2004). See Krause, supra note 175, at 91110 (describing the variety of
informational tools available to the OIG for effecting compliance with the fraud and abuse laws).
177. One of the most intelligent and persuasive proponents of the position that health-care
markets are not that different is Mark Pauly. See, e.g., Mark V. Pauly, Is Medical Care
Different?, in COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 19
(Warren Greenberg ed., 1978). In law, the most consistent and persuasive free-market advocates
have been Clark Havighurst and James Blumstein. See Clark C. Havighurst, I’ve Seen Enough!
My Life and Times in Health Care Law and Policy, 14 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L. MED. 107 (2004);
James Blumstein, Health Care Law and Policy: Whence and Whither?, 14 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.
MED. 35 (2004).
178. Timothy S. Jost, Introduction–Regulation of the Healthcare Professions, in
REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 1, 34 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 1997).
179. See for example the FDA’s recent move to regulate Ephedra. Final Rule Declaring
Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids Adulterated Because They Present an
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Regardless of how this debate is resolved, administrative oversight of
health care is likely to continue, indeed probably to increase, because of the
inescapable public role in health-care financing. For reasons explained briefly
above, and at length elsewhere,180 a public role in insuring the public, or
segments of it, for health care is inevitable. If public money is going to be
spent on health care, some control over the utilization of publicly financed
products and services and protection against fraud and abuse is inescapable,
and some public oversight of the quality and quantity of publicly purchased
care is likely. As long as we rely primarily on private health insurance to
finance health care, regulation of private insurance to assure solvency and fair
claims practices is necessary, and attempts to control underwriting to expand
access to care are likely.181
We can, of course, attempt to privatize public systems, and conservative
commentators and health insurers and managed-care organizations that are
likely to profit from privatization, will continue to push for this.182 Our
experience with the Medicare+Choice program, however, demonstrates that
privatization makes no sense in terms of efficiency and raises serious equity
problems as well.183 The true cost of the Medicare Advantage program, which
is also leaking out, underlines the high cost of privatization of public
programs.184 In any event, privatization is likely to expand rather than contract
regulation because it enhances the need to regulate participating insurers and
managed-care organizations while not wholly obviating the need for regulating
providers. In sum, the pervasive involvement of administrative entities in
health care is likely to remain for the foreseeable future.
The final alternative that we have considered to public administrative
regulation is private regulation through professional networks. Peer review
and self-regulation are likely to continue to play an important role in the
health-care industry for the foreseeable future. Indeed, professional power
seems to be reasserting itself as managed care has receded.185 But professional
Unreasonable Risk; Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 6788 (Feb. 11, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.
119).
180. JOST, supra note 77.
181. See Jost, supra note 130, at 472483.
182. See, e.g., TRUDY LIEBERMAN, SLANTING THE STORY: THE FORCES THAT SHAPE THE
NEWS (2000) (documenting the campaign of the Heritage Foundation pushing the privatization of
public health care provision).
183. GERALDINE DALLEK ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, LESSONS FROM
MEDICARE+CHOICE FOR MEDICARE REFORM, POLICY BRIEF 5–7 (June 2003), available at
http://www.cmwf.org/programs/medfutur/dallek_mclessonsforreform_pb_658.pdf.
184. See BRIAN BILES ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE COST OF PRIVATIZATION:
EXTRA PAYMENTS TO MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PLANS, ISSUE BRIEF (May 2004), available at
http://www.cmwf.org/programs/medfutur/biles_extrapayments_ib_750.pdf.
185. See David E. Grembowski et al., Managed Care and the US Health Care System: A
Social Exchange Perspective, 54 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1167 (2002).
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self-regulation is unlikely to replace public regulation any time soon. Its
usefulness is limited by its particular competencies. There are some functions
such as oversight of enforcement of the antitrust or fraud and abuse laws to
which self-regulation is peculiarly unsuited, while oversight of other
functions,186 such as approval or new drugs and devices is likely to require
resources unavailable to professional networks. Moreover, as noted above,
transfer of authority from public to private regulatory entities does not
necessarily mean that there will be less administrative law.
In sum, our examination of institutional alternatives for governing health
care leaves us with the conclusion that a prominent role for public or private
administrative entities is going to continue indefinitely. This leads us to our
second and final question, however: Should administrative law continue to
dominate health-care law?
If the answer to the first question is that administrative entities, public and
private, will continue to play a major role in overseeing health-care
organization and finance, then the answer to this question would seem selfevident. Administrative law was developed, at least in part, to assure that
administrative entities serve the public interest. One can argue how well it
does this, and one can certainly contend that it could be improved. At its best,
however, administrative law promotes principles of fairness, transparency,
reflectiveness, non-discrimination, and accountability that are basic values in
our legal system. Administrative law offers the hope of making professional
self-regulation more attentive to public values and making public and private
regulation of health-care financing more equitable. As long as administrative
entities continue to play a major role in health care, administrative law will
continue to oversee them.
VI. CONCLUSION
Administrative law, therefore, will continue to be inextricably entwined
with health law. We will continue to argue about whether this should be so,
but we are unlikely to ever totally eliminate the sway of administrative law in
this area. In the short term, indeed, the application of administrative law may
increase rather than decrease, as we continue to struggle to expand access to
health care, reduce its cost, and improve its quality. We need to focus,
therefore, on how we might improve the application of administrative law to
health care, or even how we might improve administrative law. What the
marriage between administrative law and health care may need, that is to say,
is not a divorce, but rather marriage counseling. This is one of the potential
contributions of this symposium, and it is a worthwhile enterprise.
186. The reluctance of the AMA to take on physician conflicts of interest prior to the Stark
legislation illustrates this point. See MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS:
PHYSICIANS’ CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, 3145 (1993).
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